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Beyond Legal Rights? The Future of 
Legal Rights and the Welfare System 
Paul K. Legler* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Poverty policy has been subject to intense scrutiny over the 
past decade. Some commentators have concluded that our 
poverty policy has been a complete failure and that the 
programs and laws which were designed to alleviate poverty 
have actually had the opposite effect of which they were 
intended, and have actually created more poverty. 1 Others 
take the position that the war on poverty was never launched 
to any significant degree.2 Most commentators have concluded 
that there has been a mixed degree of success and that we can 
continue to make progress if we carefully analyze our successes 
and failures and design programs carefully tailored with the 
lessons of the past in mind. 3 
Poverty program design and implementation have largely 
been functions of the legislative and executive branches of 
government, but they have also been affected to a large degree 
by court challenges and rulings. The concept of welfare as a 
legal right was developed by advocates for the poor and 
implemented through both the legislature and the judiciary to 
recognize the role and dignity of the individual in the welfare 
system. Like the issue of poverty policy in general, the issue of 
* B.A., University of North Dakota, 1976; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1979; 
M.P.A., Harvard University, 1991. Currently, a Senior Policy Analyst, Harvard 
University, Center for Social Policy. I would like to thank Harvard Law School 
Professor Lance Liebman for his encouragement and comment on this article. 
1. For a conservative view of the effects of poverty policy, see CHARLES 
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984); GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981). 
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY (1984). 
:3. See DAVID ELLWOOD, POCJR SUPPORT (1988); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE 
TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); SHELDON H. DANZIGER & DANIEL H. WEINBERO, 
Fit:HTINt: POVERTY (1986). 
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the legal rights system in welfare has also begun to undergo 
scrutiny. 
Many advocates for the poor have been asking whether the 
present legal rights system has been successful in protecting 
the individual in the welfare system. Has the legal rights 
system made the plight of those in poverty better or has it 
contributed to their problems? Does the legal rights system 
contribute to positive change of the social and economic 
conditions keeping individuals in poverty, or does it actually 
act as an impediment to change? Is it time to move away from 
reliance on legal rights to protect the poor in a welfare state 
and, if so, what kind of system do we want in its place? The 
conclusions of those addressing these questions will likely differ 
just as those examining our poverty programs as a whole have 
differed. However, by looking at these questions from many 
perspectives perhaps we can shed enough light on the matter 
to begin to reach some understanding and agreement. 
One theme of this article is that the legal rights system in 
welfare does have severe limitations. First, it may have been 
advanced by some as promising more than it can ever deliver 
because legal rights alone can never alleviate poverty. Second, 
the accomplishments of legal rights have been limited by 
setbacks in the political struggle of the poor. 
While those who criticize the legal rights system argue 
that such a _system is defective because it is subject to 
subversion by the political process, they are unable to offer any 
alternative that would not be more abusive to the dignity of the 
individual and subject to an even greater possibility of 
subversion by the political process. 
While recognizing these limitations, it is my thesis that the 
legal rights system has improved the conditions of the poor and 
that it also continues to be a necessary part of the base from 
which social movements directed towards solving some of the 
problems of the poor will emerge. The legal rights system must 
be both completed and expanded because the scope of legal 
rights will continue to determine the extent of dignity available 
to the individual poor in the welfare state. 
In part II, this article will trace the rise of the legal rights 
in the United States welfare system. Part III will address the 
criticisms of the legal rights system. Part IV will examine the 
validity of these criticisms, and part V will pay particular 
attention will be paid to issues of discretion and 
decentralization which have recently been proposed as part of a 
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necessary reform of the system. Finally, part VI suggests how 
legal rights can be completed, expanded, and what the future 
may hold. 
II. THE RISE OF LEGAL RIGHTS 
In order to address the issue of the direction of legal rights 
in the welfare system,4 it is helpful to briefly examine the 
history behind the rise of legal rights. The modern welfare 
system was created, in large part, at the birth of the New Deal. 
The New Deal saw the enactment of the Social Security 
Act which attempted to alleviate some of the social problems of 
the depression era. The scope of the initial programs was very 
limited. The Social Security Act was intended to provide 
assistance to only certain categories of individuals that were 
considered deserving of governmental assistance: the blind, 
aged, disabled and dependent children. The means to do this 
was through joint federal-state cooperation-cooperative 
federalism-wherein the federal government provided financial 
assistance and general guidelines to the states. Benefits for the 
poor were based largely on "structured discretion" wherein the 
states had broad latitude in the operation of the programs.5 
Welfare was viewed as either a privilege or a charity. The 
conditions of eligibility set the outer limits for aid. But within 
these limits, the state could largely give or withhold aid as it 
saw fit and on any additional conditions it wished to impose.6 
This discretion extended down to the bottom level of the 
bureaucracy where the social worker had broad discretion in 
dealing with the individual. 
The goal of the social worker was purported to be one of 
rehabilitation of the poor individual.7 The professional social 
worker was to act in a professional manner with the best 
interest of the individual in mind. In reality, the social worker 
was subject to pressure and constraints of budgets, pressures 
4. I use the terms "welfare" or "welfare system" as a general reference to 
what are traditionally considered welfare programs: Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security Insurance (SSI), food stamps and 
general assistance. Medical assistance and various housing assistance programs 
could also he included although they have somewhat different characteristics. 
fi. RAND RosENBLATr, Social Dutie;; and the Problem of Right:> in the American 
Welfare System, THE POLITICS OF LAW 93 (1990). 
6. CARL WELLMAN, WELFARE RIGHTS 44 (1982). 
7. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 
92 YALE L.J. 1198 (198:1). 
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from the bureaucracy above and social, and community 
pressure. The result was often an abuse of discretion due to the 
basing of decisions on considerations other than in the best 
interest of the individual poor person. Instead, the decisions 
were made on budgetary considerations based on the 
communities concept of who was deserving or the workers 
individual preference and identification with the individual 
poor person. Blacks in the South were all but excluded from 
participation in social welfare programs,8 and eligibility 
throughout the United States was often the result of arbitrary 
or discriminatory decisions. 9 
There was no recognized constitutional right to due 
process. Although the Social Security Act made provision for 
fair hearings, the hearing procedures were limited to programs 
receiving federal funds and there was no requirement of a full 
range of procedural protections nor requirements of a hearing 
until after termination of benefits. The result was that the 
action of the state, agency or individual welfare worker could 
largely go unchallenged. The United States Supreme Court 
never considered a case involving the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program until 1968.10 Lawyers 
for the poor were almost non-existent until the middle 1960s 
and the states and local agencies could largely do what they 
wanted with their welfare programs. 
The legal rights movement in welfare was largely born out 
of two avenues. First, advocates for the poor began to see the 
legal system as a possible means to address the arbitrariness 
and harassment existing in the system. Analogies were made to 
the civil rights struggle which focused on the rights of 
individuals in their dealing with the state and where litigation 
had played an organizing role. 11 A number of lawyers for the 
poor began to map out a strategy for using the courts to impose 
some constraints on the system and to give power to the 
8. See THEDA SKOCPOL, The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of 
Contemporary Welfare Dilemmas, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1988). 
9. See FRANCIS PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY 
THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL, (1977); FRANCIS PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, 
REGULATING THE POOR 309 (1971). 
10. Barbara Sard, The Role of Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 CLEARINOHOUSE 
REV. 367-:~88 (1988). 
11. ARYEN NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT 132 (1982). 
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poor. 12 
Second, theorists began to address the issue of rights to 
government benefits. In an influential article published in the 
Yale Law Journal, titled "The New Property," Charles Reich 
argued that government benefits should be viewed as a 
right. 13 Government had become a source of wealth and 
government benefits of all sort were as important to individual 
liberty as traditional property. As the "new property," 
government benefits should be accorded the same procedural 
and substantive legal protection as traditional property. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s the courts began to address these 
issues of both procedural and substantive protections. 
Procedural protections for government welfare benefits 
were recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
Goldberg v. Kelly. 14 The Court recognized welfare as more 
than a mere privilege and, while not explicitly recognizing it as 
a "right," the Court recognized that welfare was 
constitutionally protected and thus due process protections 
applied. 15 While due process required a balancing of the 
governmental interest in summary adjudication and the 
recipients loss, due process did not require a judicial or 
quasi-judicial trial. The Court did, however, recognize a need 
for protections that would enable the recipient to challenge the 
agency's actions. 16 The Court concluded that there was a right 
to a hearing, with notice, and the right to appear personally. 17 
The recipient also had the right to appear with counsel and 
confront and cross-examine witnesses as well as have one's own 
witnesses appear. Most importantly, perhaps, the Court 
recognized the right to a hearing in AFDC cases prior to 
termination of benefits. 18 This protected benefits for the 
AFDC client who otherwise was at the mercy of the welfare 
bureaucrat. Now the recipient could confront arbitrary or 
unfair bureaucratic action without the risk of being terminated 
and going without assistance until an appeal could reinstate 
the grant. These procedural rights greatly increased the 
possibilities to challenge welfare agency action. 
12. SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POCJR IN COURT 48 (1990). 
1:1. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. n;j (1964). 
14. :397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
15. !d. at 262·64. 
16. !d. at 266-67. 
17. !d. at 267-70. 
18. lei. at 264-65. 
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The substantive rights theme of legal rights was directed 
in three areas. First, as part of the abandonment of the 
rightJprivilege distinction, the right to privacy, travel, and some 
degree of family autonomy was recognized. The Supreme Court 
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 19 invalidated a one year residency 
requirement on the basis of a right to travel. In King v. 
Smith,20 the Supreme Court rejected the so-called man in the 
house rules. Further, midnight raids were prohibited by lower 
federal courts.21 
Second, the concept of welfare benefits as a legal 
entitlement arose. 22 As a legal entitlement the recipient had a 
right to receive benefits within the statutory authority of the 
federal government and judicial process could be used to review 
the policies and decisions of the states. No longer could the 
states and localities make up their own eligibility criteria as 
there had to be uniformity in the system. No longer was 
welfare to be seen as a matter of official discretion. 
This change to viewing welfare benefits as an entitlement 
turned the system around from one of gratuitous charity to one 
of giving the individual power to assert a right to benefits. It 
recognized that welfare like many government benefits for the 
non-poor, such as tax benefits, credits, or Social Security 
Retirement, was to be based upon law and not official 
discretion. 
The third direction of the legal rights theme was aimed 
towards obtaining support for the legal rights theory as a 
constitutional right. Proponents wanted the courts to recognize 
the right to some minimum or subsistence income.23 This 
third direction of the substantive legal rights theme met 
without success. In Dandridge v. Williams, 24 the Supreme 
Court dashed the hope that there would be a constitutionally 
based right to any kind of bare income.25 The Court ruled that 
welfare legislation was to be tested under the traditional 
19. 894 U.S. 618 (1969). 
20. 892 U.S. 809 (1968). 
21. It was not uncommon for welfare "investigators" to make late night visits 
to recipients' homes to see if the father was in the home and therefore the family 
not eligible for AFDC. 
22. Sard, supra note 10, at 870-72. 
2:3. See LAWRENCE, supra note 12, at 49. 
24. :{97 U.S. 471 (1970). 
25. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONUING To AMERICA 186 (1989). 
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concept of equal protection, that is, minimum rationality.26 
The poor were not to be given special consideration under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the constitution. 
While not going as far as many of those involved in the 
struggle wanted, the legal rights development made three 
lasting changes in the welfare system. First, it established the 
notion of welfare as a legal entitlement. Welfare would never 
again be seen as a privilege or gratuity. If the government 
created benefits the individual had an enforceable interest in 
those benefits. Second, eligibility was federalized. States could 
no longer impose their own discretionary eligibility criteria on 
the operation of the federal programs. And third, fairness was 
ensured by due process procedures. Recipients could challenge 
decisions concerning their lives and enforce their rights. 
Ill. THE CRITIQUE OF LEGAL RIGHTS 
The legal rights movement, while making some long 
lasting changes, failed to address other concerns of the poor. It 
did nothing to address the adequacy of benefit levels. In 
Rosado v. Wyman/7 the Supreme Court refused to interfere 
with the states adoption of their own benefit levels. States 
continue to set benefit levels which do not even meet their 
standard of need.28 In many states the benefits continue to be 
woefully inadequate.29 
The use of rules which were promoted to restrict discretion 
were often turned on their head especially in the Reagan Era 
when the rules were used to restrict access to benefits. The 
rigid rules were often used to alienate clients as verification 
requirements increased beyond any logical reason. There were 
so many requirements that many recipients simply gave up 
trying to meet all the requirements imposed by the rules. 
Quality control pressured workers to focus on technical 
requirements rather than helping those in need. As a result, 
many of the eligible clients never received benefits.30 
26. Dandridge, 897 U.S. at 484. 
27. 897 u.s. 397 (1970). 
28. Overview vf Entitlement Programs, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 597 (1991). 
29. ld. at 599. For a three person family maximum AFDC benefits are $124.00 
in Alabama, $190.00 in Louisiana, and $120.00 in Mississippi. 
30. See MICHAEL SOSIN, Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-1980 FIGHTING 
POVERTY (1986). 
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Due process rights were not meaningful in many cases 
because of the maldistribution of power between the state and 
the recipient. Joel Handler31 has argued that in order for due 
process to work a number of conditions must be met: (1) the 
client must be aware of the injury; (2) the client must think 
that the agency is at fault; (3) the client must be aware that 
there is a remedy; (4) the client must have the resources to 
pursue her case; and (5) the advantages of pursuit must 
outweigh the costs.32 Handler maintains that due process 
protections are not meaningful because these conditions rarely 
exist. 
Legal rights have recently been more and more narrowly 
construed by the Supreme Court.33 Unless the legislature has 
been very explicit, the Court is unwilling to extend any 
protection beyond the legislatures' clear pronouncements. The 
term "managerial formalism" has been used to describe a 
formalistic process that denies the claim of the poor against 
government on grounds of deference to the democratic process 
unless there is explicit legislative and constitutional commands 
and defers to the "expertise" of legislators and bureaucrats on 
social welfare issues.34 
The conservative right has had a great deal of influence in 
determining the extent to which the poor will receive 
entitlements. Not only has the legislature restricted access to 
benefits by narrowing the eligibility criteria but the executive 
agencies have used rulemaking authority to both restrict rules 
protecting the poor and to authorize greater agency control over 
the lives of the poor. The concept of entitlement is subject to 
subversion because its protection is shallow. It is dependent 
upon the political struggle to define the extent of the 
entitlements. 
The critique of legal rights from the critical legal studies 
perspective goes even further. 35 The critical legal studies view 
31. Joel Handler has written extensively about poverty law and poverty 
lawyers. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY (1990); 
JOEL F. HANDLER, LAST RESORTS (1983); JOEL F. HANDLER, PuBLIC INTEREST LAW: 
AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978); JOEL F. HANDLER, LAWYERS 
AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE 
PooR (1972). 
:12. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION 22 (1986). 
:1::l. RoSENBLATT, supra note 5, at 95-102. 
:34. !d. at 96. 
;{fi. See DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (1990) 
(an overview of critical legal studies). 
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argues that the struggle for legal rights has done more harm 
than good.36 In this view the legal rights struggle has 
legitimized oppression by deflecting the political struggle into 
meaningless confrontations with the bureaucracy. The legal 
struggle does no good because it ignores underlying symptoms 
while maintaining existing social and power relationships. 
William Simon has argued that the substantive rights 
theme has actually inhibited redistributive efforts that 
otherwise would have been supported by a broader liberal 
program.37 He also argues that legal rights has not lead to 
increased participation rates but has lead to increased 
bureaucratization and a move from a social worker model to 
clerks.38 Law and management concerns have transformed the 
system wherein eligibility is based on rules, not standards, fact 
finding has been formalized, and quality control is used against 
the client. He proposes a return to standards, decentralization 
and downward professionalization.39 
IV.THE VALIDITY OF THE CRITIQUE 
It is true that the promise many saw for legal rights never 
materialized. Advocates of legal rights in welfare were too 
optimistic because legal rights alone never had the potential to 
alleviate poverty. However, like the re-evaluation of poverty 
policy in the past decade the critique of legal rights has often 
gone too far. Many critics equate the failure of the uncompleted 
process of implementing the system of legal rights as a failure 
of the entire concept. In my view, it is not the rights concept 
that is the obstacle to the alleviation of poverty. The obstacle to 
the alleviation of poverty is the political powerlessness of the 
poor. The poor have, for the most part, lost the political 
struggle and the scope of legal rights is often determined by 
that political struggle. The legal rights system has not 
decreased the power of the poor, it has acted to check total 
powerlessness and the plight of the poor would be worse 
86. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (19H4); Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 708-09 (1980). 
:n. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 14:n (1986); see also William H. Simon, Legal Informality and 
Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384 (1985). 
38. William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. 
1. REV. 1 (1985). 
39. See Simon, supra note 7. 
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without a legal rights system. 
While it is true that legal rights has faced many obstacles 
and setbacks, the critics fail to acknowledge its 
accomplishments. Contrary to William Simon's view, legal 
rights has opened the welfare system to participation by 
millions. This has been evident to almost all who have been 
involved in legal rights struggles. The overturning of two 
restrictions alone, the substitute parent rule and the residency 
requirement rule, opened up the system to between 300,000 
and 400,000 poor people.40 Legal rights challenges in food 
stamp cases resulted in the poor receiving hundreds of millions 
of dollars of food. 41 Legal righthas expanded welfare roles 
because people of long standing eligibility could now get 
benefits.42 As a consequence, millions have received benefits 
so that they could better feed, clothe, and house their families. 
Criticism of the due process protections in legal rights 
ignores the fact that the adversary system did help many win 
important substantive rights. The due process protections also 
have a magnifying effect on the entire system. Arbitrary and 
mean-spirited denials have been reduced simply because of the 
threat of appeals that exists. The bureaucrats have been forced 
to play by the rules because of the watchdog effect of clients 
who are aware of their rights and are backed by legal services 
attorneys. Thus, the adversary system is beneficial even to 
those poor who do not use it directly. Lawyers for the poor are 
well aware of how one person's success in the adversary system 
can change the way an entire agency interprets a rule or deals 
with the issue that was challenged. 
Bureaucratization has largely come from the concerns of 
management and not simply as a result of legal rights. Partly, 
it is simply the result of increased numbers to be served within 
tight budgets. Bureaucratization has occurred throughout 
government and is not limited to the welfare system. Legal 
rights in welfare has played only a minor role in the 
bureaucratization of the system. Criticism of legal rights from 
critical legal studies, while perhaps offering much in terms of 
our understanding of the legal system as a whole, offers no 
alternative to legal rights that is even remotely viable at this 
time. At times the criticism amounts to nothing more than a 
40. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM, 203 (1978). 
41. Id. at 205. 
42. P!VENS & CLOWARD, supra note 9, at 3:-34 
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legal realism view coupled with utopianismY Ed Sparer has 
argued that the criticism of legal rights from critical legal 
studies has tended towards exaggeration and has not 
recognized the potential contribution of rights.44 While rights 
and entitlement programs can occasionally be used to 
legitimize oppression, they are also affirmations of human 
value.45 Until the critical legal studies movement develops 
more concrete alternatives we can hardly afford to abandon a 
legal rights system which, in the view of most practitioners, 
does benefit the poor in many tangible ways. Of course, the 
criticism of legal rights has also come from the far right who 
feel that the concept of legal rights in welfare is wrong because 
welfare should be demeaning.46 While I recognize that such 
arguments exist, it is not the purpose of this paper to address 
these broader poverty policy considerations that, in my view, 
have been largely discredited by others.47 
The critique of legal rights does challenge us to 
re-evaluate, in more detail, two specific issues concerning legal 
rights, discretion and decentralization. 
V. LEGAL RIGHTS, DISCRETION AND DECENTRALIZATION 
One result of a critical look at legal rights has been a 
re-evaluation of discretion. The view expressed by a number of 
legal theorists is that discretion is not only a necessary part, 
but a desirable component of a social welfare system.48 The 
discretion issue is complicated, and one that deserves careful 
analysis before acceptance or rejection. 
Discretion in welfare generally means that there is an 
element of individual judgment in one's decisions or actions. It 
4:j. For a critique of critical legal studies, see David A. Price, Taking Rights 
Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271 (1989); 
Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be a Radical, :j6 STAN. L. REV. 247 
(1984). 
44. Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social 
Structure: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, as STAN. L. 
REV. 508 (1984). . 
4fi. ld. 
46. See MURRAY, supra note 1. 
47. See, e.g., MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESEHVJNn Poem: FROM THE WAR ON 
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989); ELLWOOD, supra note ;j; FRED BLOCK, 
ET AL., THE MEAN SEASON (1987). 
48. HANDLEH, supra note ;j2. Apparently, Handler has reversed his position 
somewhat. See HANDLER, supra note :n. William Simon has also argued for more 
discretion. Simon, supra note :n. 
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is not to say that there are no rules but that in an area of 
conduct generally covered by rules, the rule's dictates are 
indeterminate allowing for the exercise of judgment.49 
In the welfare system discretion can occur at multiple 
levels. It is important for those proposing more discretion and 
those opposed to it to specify the particular level of discretion 
to which they are referring. Discretion can exist at the state 
level, agency level, or the street level. At the state level 
discretion allows the individual state to both decide whether 
certain programs will be implemented and/or how the programs 
will be run. Discretion at the agency level is usually more 
limited but agencies are sometimes given discretion on the 
same basis as states to decide certain facets of an 
implementation policy. At the street level discretion allows the 
person who has the actual face to face encounter with the client 
to make a judgment decision affecting the client. 
At the state or agency level, discretion is seen as a positive 
goal in that it allows for experimentation and innovation.50 
Few claim to have all of the answers to the difficult questions 
about how social welfare programs should be operated. 
Experimentation and innovation are necessary to test different 
proposals while the states serve as laboratories for 
experimentation. Discretion also allows programs to be tailored 
to meet local economic and social conditions, such as local labor 
market conditions. A work program in the inner-city may need 
to be operated differently than a work program in a rural area 
because the employment conditions facing clients are quite 
different. 
Some discretion at the street level is a fact of life.51 The 
clients' circumstances, needs, and abilities to interact with the 
street level worker are subject to incalculable differences. It is 
impossible, even if it is desirable, to write rules to cover every 
single possibility facing the street level worker dealing with the 
client. In fact, if there are too many rules, the worker would 
simply use discretion out of necessity because the volume of 
rules constantly being revised makes it impractical to use. 
49. Robert E. Goodin, Welfare, Rights and Discretion, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
2a2 (1986). 
50. See Newstock Ice Co. v. Liefman, 285 U.S. 262 (19a2) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
51. For a valuable analysis of discretion at "street level," see MICHAEL LIPSKY, 
STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 
(1980). 
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Emergency assistance is a good example of the need for 
some discretion in the system.52 Emergency assistance is an 
optional component of the AFDC program, and it allows for 
differences in the needs of individual clients. People are subject 
to unforeseeable events. Their household goods may be 
destroyed in a fire, their furnace may break down, they may be 
faced with unexpected evictions or utility shutoffs. Emergency 
assistance provides a cash supplement to their ordinary AFDC 
grant to allow them to deal with the emergency. Since the term 
"emergency" cannot be defined with precision there must be an 
element of judgment exercised by the street level worker to 
determine both what constitutes an emergency and what 
amount of cash is necessary to alleviate the immediate need. 
Another example of the need for discretion is in the 
determination of what constitutes a disability under the Social 
Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income 
programs. Whether someone is or is not disabled can be 
dictated by rule to a certain extent and the Social Security 
Administration has done so by creating rules stating that 
certain medical conditions will automatically be considered a 
disability.53 However, it is impossible to create a rule for every 
conceivable medical condition that could be disabling. Since the 
determination of disability under the law involves vocational as 
well as medical considerations for most claimants, the Social 
Security Administration has promulgated another set of rules 
in the form of tables or "grids" to take into consideration 
various statutory factors such as age, education, work 
experience, and residual functional capacity.54 This has all 
been done in an attempt to add consistency and predictability 
to the decisions of the administrative law judges making the 
disability determination. 
While the Social Security Administration has attempted to 
limit the discretion of the law judges by the promulgation of 
rules, advocates for the disabled have generally attempted to 
expand the discretion arguing that people are entitled to an 
individualistic determination and that rules alone cannot 
52. Joel F. Handler argues that a discretionary system for emergencies and 
special needs should have been maintained to a greater extent than it was. While 
some states have maintained emergency assistance, others have not. See JOEL F. 
HANDLER, LAST RESORTS (1988); Joel F. Handler, Discretion in Social Welfare: The 
Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270 (1988). 
ii8. 20 CFR § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 
ii4. 20 CFR § 404, Subpart P, App. 2. 
82 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
provide the individual assessment that is necessary. Also, 
administrative law judges have sufficient independence to 
make decisions without undue political or public pressure and 
without abusing their discretion by denying benefits based 
upon budgetary considerations rather than the disability 
determination. In this context some discretion may be viewed 
as a desirable thing from the client's perspective. It allows the 
client's case to be decided upon an individualistic assessment 
which includes many considerations that rules, no matter how 
detailed, can provide. Individual assessments are necessary in 
determinations such as disability cases because of the elements 
of observation and judgment in the determination. 
Discretion allows the street level financial worker to 
consider individual needs and differences of the welfare client. 
There are areas where the application of a rule may not be 
clear in the individual case and the financial worker will then 
have some degree of discretion to decide how to apply the rule. 
A responsible financial worker can consider the client's 
individual needs and make a decision in the best interest of the 
client. Questions arise as to whether the areas where discretion 
is given need to be expanded and whether the discretion will be 
responsibly exercised. 
Some writers have argued that discretion should be 
broadly expanded. In his book, The Conditions of Discretion, 
Joel F. Handler55 argues that the system of rights and 
procedural remedies developed over the last several decades 
have not worked, that the system is conceptually inadequate 
and that we should create a system wherein decisions are 
discretionary.56 Due process has failed both because of the 
maldistribution of power and because it has conceptual 
flaws. 57 The formal adversary structure under due process 
should fade as a new discretionary system arises. The 
alternative would foster cooperation and increase 
communication between agency and client. 
Handler uses the Madison, Wisconsin special education 
program as a model for the system that he proposes. He poses 
four "conditions of discretion" necessary for the system: (1) a 
decentralized system which would encourage the creative use of 
55. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, 
BUREAUCRACY (19H6). 
56. ld. at 19-40. 
fi7. ld. at 7. 
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discretion; (2) a changed role of the bureaucracy wherein 
incentives and structures at agency level would make the 
bureaucracy part of the community; (3) social movement groups 
at a grass roots level that would be seen as creating 
communicative conflict, not adversarial conflict; and (4) 
cooperative decision-making as in informed consent in its ideal 
form. 58 Handler is admittedly optimistic but sees the 
possibility of a more humane system promoting understanding, 
cooperation and communication in place of one where the 
powerlessness of the individual is increasing. 59 
While there is a place for limited discretion in the welfare 
system, the dangers of its abuse will continue until some 
fundamental changes have occurred in our political 
environment. The problems of discretion, to a large extent, 
have not changed from the pre-legal rights era although some 
new dangers have arisen. 
At the street level, clients in a discretionary system are 
faced with a sense of powerlessness as they confront the 
bureaucrats who hold the key to their perceived wellbeing. The 
self-regard of clients decreases as the power of the bureaucrats 
increases. Clients are, therefore, subject to possible 
manipulation and exploitation. 
Arbitrariness, while probably less common than perceived, 
is a problem simply because it is perceived as a possibility. 
Clients feel that the decision, whatever it is, is arbitrary 
because they have no way of knowing how the criteria for the 
decision will be applied in their case. 
Having represented many clients in seeking assistance 
under emergency assistance programs, I have seen how it can 
be used to reward "good," "deserving" clients in the 
bureaucrat's eyes and used to punish the "bad," "undeserving" 
clients. Granted, the system is not always abused, but the 
potential is always present. Generally, the more room for 
discretion in social welfare the greater the potential for abuse 
that exists under the present social and political conditions. 
At a state level, the AFDC program has always allowed 
some discretion. States have always had many options which 
they could choose to implement. For example the states, set 
their own benefit levels with the result that a state like 
Mississippi could set a monthly grant at $120.00 for a family of 
58. !d. at 1-15. 
59. !d. at 300. 
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three60 and states have, in the past, been able to choose 
whether to provide benefits to two parent families where both 
parents are unemployed.61 In my home state of North 
Dakota, individual counties are given wide discretion in the 
general assistance program in determining eligibility criteria. 
The result, not unexpectedly, is that the counties create an 
almost totally discretionary system and almost no one ever 
receives any assistance. Discretion granted to states and 
agencies makes it more difficult to use broad-based political or 
legal action to challenge the inadequacies of the programs. 
One of the major reasons that discretion is abused in 
welfare is simply because of budgetary considerations. 
Legislators looking for areas to save money, look to the welfare 
system. Administrators in response to statutory dictates, are 
bound to provide certain minimal benefits and have only a 
narrow range in which to make cuts. Wherever there is 
discretionary spending of money the agency will make cuts 
thereby reducing benefits. This desire to control spending by 
reaching discretionary areas extends all the way down to street 
level. In many instances the street level bureaucrat would like 
to provide assistance to help those in need but they are facing 
direct and implicit pressure to use whatever discretion they 
have to prevent further expenditure of money. 
Another reason that discretion is so often abused is simply 
due to irresponsible administrators and street level workers. 
By irresponsible, I mean that they are unduly affected by 
pressures to conform their behavior to what they perceive to be 
the public expectation regardless of what is right or what is 
best for the recipient. They perceive a public expectation that 
they should keep the poor in their place because the poor are 
poor due to character or cultural defects. This public 
expectation has been created, in part, because of the success of 
the right in characterizing the problems of poverty as cultural 
rather than as one caused by economic conditions62 or class 
divisions.63 In this view, the poor are the undeserving and 
60. For a look at poverty in rural Mississippi, see KEN AULE'ITA, THE 
UNDERCLASS 13 (1982). 
61. H.R. COMMIITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102 Cong., 1st Sess., Overview of 
Entitlement Programs 566 (1991). 
62. ELLWOOD, supra note :3 (identifies the causes of poverty as largely economic 
in origin). 
63. See BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING (1989) (an analysis of how 
class division affects poverty.). 
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therefore, if there is any room for discretion all decisions 
should go against them. 
In order for discretion to work in social welfare you must 
have both responsible administrators or bureaucrats and 
reliable and adequate budgets. Some possible means to bring 
about those criteria are discussed in the next section. 
As for Handler's conditions for discretion, they are largely 
a utopian dream insofar as he proposes a system that promises 
more than an extremely limited role. We need visions of a new 
and different future to challenge us to change in the present. 
The danger is that some may come to believe that we can 
create the discretionary system now and the system will then 
change people's behavior. Handler's system fails on a number 
of counts. 
First, Handler's system is dependent upon a much 
reformed bureaucracy. He sees a better educated and more 
professionalized bureaucrat. Handler is not alone here as 
others have called for professionalism as part of the remedy for 
what supposedly ails the legal rights system.64 But that is not 
going to happen in the welfare system until there is both a new 
attitude about welfare and adequate budgets. Better trained 
and more professionalized bureaucrats will not emerge from 
current conditions and the present system. 
Second, it is difficult to see how the street-level bureaucrat 
is going to be professionalized given that she/he is faced with 
routinization of tasks due to the sheer number of poor. 
Professionalization at the street level would require a 
revolutionary change in the delivery of social-welfare 
benefits.65 While this change may be desirable, it would be 
folly to move towards a discretionary system believing that 
professionalism of the bureaucrat is going to follow. 
Bureaucratic accountability will decrease if discretion is 
increased. Given the present social and political climate 
discretion would continue to largely be used as a way to deny 
benefits to keep welfare budgets down. As discretion increases 
it becomes more difficult to challenge agency or bureaucratic 
action because courts will almost always defer to agency action 
where the agency is given discretion. 
Discretion in the welfare system is inherently attractive 
64. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 
92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983). 
65. MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 244 (1988). 
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with the public because the public generally feels that one 
function of a welfare system is to separate the deserving poor 
from the undeserving poor. Since each individual feels that 
they would be able to make such a determination based upon 
their own criteria for who is deserving, they see nothing wrong 
with giving such discretion to someone else. In reality, 
however, the criteria one endorses for determining the 
deserving varies from person to person. More discretion creates 
a larger zone in which the bureaucrat can exercise his or her 
own personal criteria for making determinations. 
Before we impose more discretion in social welfare we 
should ask whether it would be tolerated in other areas of 
governmental actions affecting us as individuals. Would we 
tolerate more discretion in the tax system? Would we want an 
Internal Revenue Service agent to have discretion in 
determining whether we get tax deductions or credits? Most 
people would not want a government official to have 
discretionary power over their lives unless they knew that the 
discretion would be exercised fairly and responsibly and with 
their input or participation in the decision making. By the 
same token, we should provide the same considerations to the 
poor. Why we do not is largely a function of the current social 
and political climate which sees the poor as different than the 
rest of society. Discretion is most dangerous in social welfare 
programs involving the poor precisely because the poor are 
unable to participate in the decision making process. 
Participation requires that one possess power; or otherwise, one 
is solely dependent upon the other party to exercise fairness 
and goodwill. In social welfare, clients are presently dealing 
from a powerless position. 
Discretion may well work in Madison's special education 
program,66 but Madison is a poor experimental model for the 
rest of the country at this time. As anyone who has been to 
Madison will realize, it is a rather unique social and political 
environment. Most importantly, however, special education is 
viewed differently in Madison than the way other types of 
welfare are viewed in the rest of the nation. Bureaucracy 
tends to reflect the prevailing social and political outlook and 
society views welfare as very different from special education 
because welfare carries a stigma that special education does 
66. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CoNDITIONS OF DISCHETION, ch. 4 (191-16). 
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not. Handler's system requires that the welfare system undergo 
a fundamental change in ideology, structure and organization, 
yet he fails to address how this will be brought about in the 
political process. 
Handler admits that a discretionary system requires a 
sharing of power between the service provider (in most cases, 
the state) and the client. His system requires that the 
bureaucracy will promote and foster the sharing of power. 
However, those that have power are much less likely to share 
it voluntarily than he assumes. The poor will only gain power 
in a slow process of individual empowerment through assertion 
of their rights and dignity and the aggregation of that power in 
social and political movements. 
In conclusion, there is nothing inherently wrong with 
discretion in social welfare and, in fact, it is desirable in many 
respects. It will, by necessity, have a place where highly 
individualistic decisions are required, such as in disability 
determinations where rules cannot address every individual 
circumstance and observation and judgment are necessary. The 
use of discretion, however, must be limited wherever there is a 
potential for abuse. 
Given the present social and political climate the danger of 
abuse of discretion in the area of social welfare is great. It is 
not enough to simply say that we need a few conditions to be 
put in place and a discretionary system will work. There must 
be more than changes in structural conditions, there must be 
deeper changes both in how society views the poor and the 
extent to which the poor have control in the political arena. 
When that happens, there is a possibility for responsible 
bureaucrats and adequate budgets so that discretion will be 
used in a responsible manner with the poor participating in the 
decision-making. 
Many theorists have also called for decentralization of 
welfare. Decentralization has been pushed from the political 
left as well as from the right. 67 Decentralization, like 
discretion, allows for judgment to be exercised in the operation 
of social welfare programs. Decentralization, however, goes 
67. Simon and Handler argue for decentralization from the left, creating a 
strange marriage with the Reagan Administration which argued for decentralization 
from the right. See William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare 
System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1988); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF 
DISCHE'J'ION (19R6). 
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beyond discretion in that it usually involves a transfer of the 
funding mechanism to the state or local level as well. Insofar 
as it allows for experimentation, innovation and flexibility in 
these programs it is attractive. Certainly we need to see new 
approaches and experiments in order to develop a better 
system. 
There is also desirability in tailoring programs to meet 
local conditions. In theory, decentralization allows for greater 
local participation in decision-making. The hope is that it will 
lead to greater cooperation and human interaction. Under the 
present political realities, however, decentralization faces many 
of the same flaws as discretion. 
General Assistance68 is the ultimate decentralized 
component of social welfare. There are no federal rules or 
funding and even the states transfer much or all of these roles 
to the county level. Given the social and political pressures on 
the welfare system the grants where the programs do exist are 
extremely small and many states and/or counties have no 
general assistance at all.69 
The chief problem impeding decentralization of the federal 
welfare programs as a viable alternative is budgetary 
considerations. The current social and political climate places 
social welfare funding low on the list of priorities for state 
government, and the states do not have the revenue raising 
capacity of the federal government. In addition, there is 
competition between states which has a greater effect on social 
welfare spending than in other spending areas. Competition for 
new business creates a call for the lowest possible taxes and 
thus state government looks toward social welfare budgets as 
an area to curtail spending. The view is that low taxes attract 
business while the degree that the poor, homeless, disabled, 
and elderly are taken care of is of little concern to business. 70 
In addition to the competition to lower taxes many states also 
compete to keep social spending low with the belief that higher 
spending would simply attract more poor to the state. 71 
The push towards discretion and decentralization as an 
alternative to the legal rights system is dangerous because it is 
68. State-run welfare programs are avaliable for those not eligible for AFDC. 
69. MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 283-85 (1986). 
70. See e.g., EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE ;17 (1991). 
71. This has been a frequent argument in Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and 
among other states. 
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likely to be subverted and used against the poor. Handler, 
Simon and others argue for a restructuring of major social 
welfare programs to allow for their approach. 72 However, it is 
not enough to base discretion and decentralization on simply 
structural changes. They underestimate the extent to which 
major political and social change would be necessary for their 
vision to work. Until that happens increased discretion and 
decentralization would be unlikely to serve the interests of the 
welfare community. Legal rights would be reduced and this 
would leave the poor with even less power than they presently 
possess. 
VI. COMPLETING AND EXPANDING LEGAL RIGHTS 
Although the promise of legal rights is yet to be fulfilled, 
legal rights have the potential of empowering the individual. 
When I speak of legal rights as empowering the individual, I 
mean the use of legal rights as a means of giving the individual 
power in his or her relationship with the state or against 
powerful private and corporate interests. It is a means of 
forcing authority to recognize the power of the individual. This 
is not to mean that this power alone will enable the poor to lift 
themselves out of poverty. As I have stated, that will require a 
social and political transformation that is beyond the scope of 
the legal system alone. However, the empowerment of 
individuals can be the first step on the road to a change of 
consciousness. This in turn can lead to an increase in political 
power. 
Those lawyers in legal services who have day to day 
contact with great numbers of poor see many instances in 
which clients are empowered when they assert their legal 
rights. I don't mean to imply that the assertion of legal rights 
has an effect on all clients or even on the majority but it 
happens much more frequently than critics of legal rights will 
admit. It is especially prevalent in civil rights and welfare 
cases. I have witnessed many instances where minorities have 
used their legal rights to challenge the power structure in civil 
72. See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State and the 
Modern/Postmodern search for the Dialogic Community, 85 UCLA L. REV. 999 
(1988). 
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rights cases. 73 Both individually and collectively civil rights 
cases can be used to empower minorities, building a sense of 
cohesion and creating a consciousness of the potential for 
power. 
The same process can occur in welfare cases. Clients are 
often invigorated and awakened by their own actions in 
asserting themselves and appealing an adverse agency action. 
They are questioning authority, often for the first time, which 
can change them and their perception of their role with the 
state. They will also tell others of their experience which will 
give others the courage to assert their own rights. Again, this 
is not to suggest that the empowerment that comes with 
asserting legal rights happens in a great percentage of cases. 
However, it has happened often enough so that the 
consciousness of many of the poor have been changed. It is part 
73. I will give one example from my own experience to illustrate the point. 
Three related families of migrant farmworkers had come from Texas to the Red 
River Valley of Minnesota as they annually do to work in the sugar beet fields. 
They secured housing in an apartment complex by entering into a lease with the 
resident manager. The owner of the apartments showed up some weeks later and, 
discovering the color of the skin of her new tenants, ordered them out stating that 
she didn't want any "damn Mexicans" in her building. The farmworkers were 
forced to leave the apartment and were unable to find other housing in the area 
and therefore lost their contract for working in the sugar beet fields. As usually 
happens in these kinds of cases, the owner denied making any such remarks and 
said they left for other reasons. The owner rigorously contested all the allegations. 
The matter came up for trial in November the following year. This meant that the 
farmworkers had to leave their work in Texas, travel across the country and stay 
for several days in order to present their case in court and at best, have a chance 
to recover rather minimal damages that would not cover their time and costs. At 
that time in an action under the state's human rights laws the farmworkers were 
limited to actual damages. I discussed these facts with them as well as the fact 
that this was a case of their word against the owner and her witnesses and that 
the local judge could easily fmd against them. These factors were quickly dismissed 
by the family members. They weren't in this for the money and, in fact, they did 
not expect to win. They were coming for the trial because they felt that what was 
done to them was not right and if they stood up for their legal rights they would 
demonstrate to the owner that they should not be treated that way. If their 
lawsuit did not win them damages they could at least help other farmworkers who 
might face the same discrimination. I remember vividly the chilly November day 
before the trial when I met with all twenty-one family members who came up 
from Texas to assert their rights. We met and sat at a picnic table in the park 
where they were sleeping in their cars because they could not afford the cust of 
motel rooms. They were totally resolute, not because they believed that the system 
would work, but because their legal rights gave them the power to bring the 
owner into court to be confronted by them as to the wrong against them. In this 
respect, the process of asserting legal rights was empowering for these people. 
While we were able to get a favorable judgment, it really did not matter so much 
to them as having the process by which to assert their rights. 
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of the process by which they come to think of entitlement 
benefits not as a charity but as a right that they can enforce. 
They realize that they can question the authority of the 
bureaucrat and the state. It is this realization that creates a 
basis for change and which can be used to foster social 
movements. The fact remains that the legal rights system in 
welfare has worked for millions of people. They were granted 
benefits because they met the criteria of definite rules and they 
had a due process system to back them up if they were not 
treated as the law required. Many, if not most, of those persons 
were able to receive their benefits without undue disregard of 
their privacy due to protections of legal rights. Legal rights 
enabled them to have some dignity during a difficult time. 
While the legal rights system in welfare has made life 
better for many, the promise of legal rights for the individual 
has admittedly fallen short of its goal in two respects. First, it 
does not work for all individuals because some are unaware of 
their rights or unable to assert them. There is a continuous 
need to provide education about rights both on an individual 
and community basis. As to social welfare rights this requires a 
continuous effort because the recipients of social welfare are 
continuously changing as new people fall into poverty to 
replace those who rise out of it. 
For those unable to assert their rights on their own we 
must provide lawyers with training in welfare law. 74 This 
requires expanded legal services for the poor. The effort to 
replace the trained staff legal services attorney with other 
forms of legal services delivery systems such as mandatory 
pro-bono attorneys and judicare, should be resisted. While 
there is a valuable place for pro-bono attorneys and other 
delivery systems in legal services for the poor, the place is not 
in providing service in welfare law. It is difficult to turn over 
representation in welfare cases to attorneys who have little 
training in an area that requires special training and expertise 
which comes from extensive involvement in this specialty. 
Second, the legal rights system has been subverted 
through the political process in this country. The subversion 
has come from the effort to restrict legal rights by legislative 
and executive action. The past decade has seen a gradual 
erosion of many legal rights both by limiting the entitlements 
74. See Phillip B. Heymann, A Law Enforcement Model for Legal Services, 28 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254, 256-57 (1989). 
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of the poor and the use of rules against the poor. This erosion 
of legal rights is a product of the political struggle and the 
same legal rights that can be limited through the political 
process can also be expanded by political struggle. This 
problem is not something that is inherently defective in legal 
rights any more than any ot}J.er alternative system. The 
political struggle will always exist and the struggle must be 
viewed as a continual process with the potential for subversion 
no matter what the system. Legal rights, however, can 
empower those involved in the political struggle, making each 
successive struggle on a different level. The level of the 
struggle is changed as legal rights grow because once a legal 
right is established it becomes more difficult to take it away. It 
can be subverted to a degree but the right enters the 
consciousness of the possessor of the right and the longer it 
exists the more difficult it becomes to eliminate. 
While empowerment through legal rights alone will never 
eliminate poverty it can be an essential component of a process 
which will reduce poverty. Those involved with the legal 
system as judges, lawyers, and legal advocates must constantly 
be aware of the potential for empowerment that does exist. 
They must not only use legal rights as a tool for individual 
change but must also link that individual empowerment with 
the political struggle. This requires a continuous dialogue 
between those in the legal system and the poor on both the 
potential and present limitation of legal rights. 75 Those 
asserting their rights must be aware that the assertion of legal 
rights as an individual must be linked with the ongoing 
political struggle. In this respect the party must be made 
aware of others who are having the same problems and of 
groups that are working towards political change on the issues 
of concern to the party. 
The assertion of legal rights, if approached in this way, can 
be instrumental in developing social movements. Individual 
empowerment if linked to the larger political struggle and 
funneled into social movements can begin to work towards 
addressing the underlying causes of poverty. 
7fi. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of 
Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. 1. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (19RR). While I 
agree with the thrust of this article, the critique of rights is too harsh. This theory 
of dialogic empowerment should be read by all legal advocates for the poor, but it 
may be too optimistic. 
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In addition to fulfilling the promise of establishing 
individual legal rights, we need to think about expanding legal 
right entitlements beyond those currently established. Legal 
right entitlements in welfare, insofar as material benefits are 
concerned, have generally been limited to: (1) modest cash 
assistance to eligible categories of persons such as families with 
dependent children (AFDC) and the disabled (SSI); (2) food 
stamps; and (3) medicaid. 
It is entirely realistic to look towards expanding 
entitlement benefits beyond this present limited scope. 
However, it will be necessary to look largely to Congress and 
state legislatures to create entitlement rights because the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to recognize rights unless there is 
fairly explicit legislative action or a change in public 
consensus.76 There is, however, the possibility of using state 
courts and state laws in some instances to create rights to 
benefits. 77 
Some have suggested that the original goal of legal rights 
was the recognition of the right to a minimum income.78 That 
never developed either through the courts or Congress and, at 
the present, the public support for such a proposal is very low. 
Although the present make-up of the United States Supreme 
Court makes it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would 
recognize such a right, writers, such as Peter Edelman, have 
suggested that the theoretical foundation be laid now since it is 
realistic that a fundamentally different Court could exist in the 
future. 79 For the present, however, it is unlikely that there 
will be much progress in the area of a minimal income. 
One possibility that is probably more realistic is developing 
the concept of the right to a job. Those advocating reform of the 
welfare system often suggest that jobs will have to be provided 
by the government because the economy cannot create enough 
jobs and is subject to too many fluctuations. 80 It will be easier 
to develop the political support for the right to a job rather 
than a right to a minimum income because of the strong work 
ethic in our national conscience. The right to a job would 
76. Sard, supra note 10, at 375. 
77. ld. at 381. 
78. See, e.g., FRANCES F. PIVENS & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE POLITICS OF 
TURMOIL (1965). 
79. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our 
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987). 
80. Ellwood, supra note 3, at 124. 
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require that the government create jobs whenever and 
wherever the economy could not provide jobs through the 
private sector. Of course, to be a meaningful right, the right to 
a job would require that the right be to a decent job at a decent 
wage. 
It is also realistic to begin to recognize the right to health 
care, day care, and housing for all Americans. Medical 
assistance coverage can be expanded or merged with a national 
health care system. While health care is not a poverty issue by 
itself it is an area where the interests of the poor and other 
classes merge. The right to day care for all of the working poor 
is an area where political support is continuing to grow. The 
idea of some type of minimal housing as a right for the 
homeless is also gaining acceptance. 
Once these social programs become established and people 
grow accustomed to and dependent on them, they will become 
rights which, although legislatively created, will acquire public 
support, making them as valuable as other rights that the 
public now takes for granted. The ideas put forth here are only 
the most obvious ones for creating an expanded list of legal 
entitlements and is not meant to be exhaustive. The political 
struggle will ultimately determine which of these and other 
ideas are accepted or rejected. 
All rights, of course, imply that someone has corresponding 
obligations. One way of expanding beyond our present reliance 
on rights is to focus more attention on the obligations of those 
bureaucrats who bear official responsibilities and duties in the 
area of social welfare. In this respect, one looks at the actions 
bureaucrats are required to take and the outcomes that they 
are responsible for. 
Bureaucratic obligations can be greatly expanded. 
Bureaucrats can be expected to be evaluated on how they fulfill 
their obligations. Obligation-based controls on bureaucrats 
allow oversight that is less dependent upon the welfare client 
to exercise control.81 In order for this approach to work, we 
must establish criteria for evaluation that considers the effect 
of all bureaucratic action on the poor. For instance, instead of 
evaluating a welfare agency simply on the present quality 
control criteria, which focuses largely on the number of 
ineligibles receiving benefits, one could turn it around and 
Rl. Goodin, supra note 49, at 256. 
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evaluate the agency on the number of those who are turned 
down or turned away at the door who were, in fact, eligible.82 
For jobs programs, one could look at the number of persons 
who received long term, not temporary, good paying jobs. 
Incentives can be built into the system for those agencies who 
have the best outcomes. This is the "carrot" approach where 
agencies and states are positively reinforced for their outcomes. 
In addition to incentives for outcomes, some agencies will 
need the "stick" approach as well as the carrot. Where agencies 
disregard the legal rights of those it is supposed to serve there 
may have to be fines and penalties. If welfare recipients are to 
be penalized under the guise of welfare fraud when they make 
mistakes, perhaps welfare bureaucrats should face punitive 
action when they callously disregard the law in denying or 
restricting benefits to the poor. Compensatory and punitive 
damages could be awarded when states, agencies or welfare 
bureaucrats ignore the law. The use of writs of mandamus 
should be expanded to require reluctant bureaucrats to carry 
out their statutory obligations. 
By imposing and enforcing bureaucratic obligations we will 
ensure that administrators are held responsible for agency 
decisions. Responsible administrators will focus on the duties 
and obligations they have to develop agencies responsive to the 
needs of the poor. This will be one step towards the responsible 
use of discretion and decentralization. 
Another way of expanding the scope of legal rights is to 
begin to look beyond individual legal rights to group rights. 
The concept of group rights suggests that groups can possess 
rights and enforce them irrespective of individual 
applications. s:l Courts have indirectly recognized group rights 
by granting them remedies for racial discrimination.84 The 
idea of discrimination in employment law, for example, 
presupposes that groups have rights. 
Group rights have also been indirectly recognized when 
class action suits have resulted in broad remedies wherein 
refunds have been ordered to a "group" of consumers. Groups, 
such as industry employees, could be protected by legislation 
H2. See Timothy J. Casey & Mary Mannix, Quality Control in Public Assistance: 
Victimizmg the Pour Through One-Sided Accountability, 22 CLEARIN<;HOUSE REV. 
1:3Hl (1988). 
Sa. ROSENBLATT, supra note 5, at 104. 
H4. See TUSHNET, supra note 65, at 282. 
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restricting plant closings and corporations moving out of the 
state or country. Whether groups are naturally formed as 
groups of Mro-Americans and American Indians or artificially 
formed such as consumer or poverty groups, both legislatures 
and courts can expand benefits and remedies to broad groups 
that have otherwise fared poorly in the political struggle. The 
development of group rights will be slow as society sorts out 
the obligations owed and the groups to be protected.85 It 
requires the re-evaluation of the public's view of the duty owed 
to the weak in society. Such embedded ideology will change 
only slowly and therefore expansion of rights to groups will, as 
a practical matter, come only slowly. 
The content and scope of legal rights will ultimately be 
determined through the political struggle. In order to build 
political support to reverse the subversion of legal rights and to 
expand the scope beyond the present individual legal rights, it 
will be necessary for the poor to seek a convergence of interests 
with other social and political groups. To seek a convergence of 
interests is to find a common ground of interests and to work 
together in the political arena for a solution. 
The history of the last twenty-five years suggests that the 
poor will need the help of other interest groups in political 
alliances to gain any large degree of political power. As much 
as many advocates for the poor feel that the poor themselves 
need to become empowered and rise up to demand significant 
change of the social and economic conditions that keep them in 
poverty, it has become apparent to most of them that while the 
problems facing such a task are not insurmountable, they are 
extremely imposing. The best chance for empowerment of the 
poor rests in their finding common ground with other interest 
groups and classes. The social movements of the poor must be 
converged with those of other groups and classes, where 
possible, in order to create wider based social programs. This is 
not to say that we should abandon all means-tested programs 
but that, in some instances, broader programs will have 
broader political support and hence not be subject to subversion 
by conservative administrations.86 
85. See ALLAN C. HUTCHINGSON, LAW AND COMMUNITY (1989) (An especially 
guud article is by Mark Tushnet, "Law and Group Rights: Federalism as a 
Model."). 
86. William Julius Wilson argues for a comprehensive program that combines 
employment policies with social welfare policies and that features universal as 
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The broadest area for developing a convergence of interests 
is in the common interest of the working class and even the 
middle class. The common interests can be developed in a 
number of areas. Many economic interests are shared by these 
different classes. The working class and the poor often share a 
common interest in preventing the abandonment by businesses 
of the inner cities, government supports and subsidies for 
creating jobs, adequate daycare, expanded medical care, and 
adequate wages for work. Another common interest among the 
poor, the working class, and the middle class is the interest in 
seeing that the wealthy pay a larger share of taxes. 
The poor must also continue to develop a convergence of 
interests with feminists. The "feminization of poverty" is real 
and the majority of poor families are now headed by women.87 
In many respects the interests of the feminists are the same 
interests as those of the poor because so many women are poor. 
Feminists and poor women share an interest in many policy 
areas including ending sex discrimination in the labor force, 
expanding job training for women, promoting equal pay for 
equal work, enforcing child support obligations, and providing 
affordable quality daycare. Feminists and the poor must begin 
to form an alliance to use the political process to address their 
common concerns. Feminists in the legal system, as lawyers 
and judges must use their influence in the legal system to give 
broad meaning to the rights of women. 
As interests are converged solutions will be proposed that 
solve the broader interest. These solutions will have the broad 
political support necessary to get programs and laws enacted. 
The legal rights of the poor will be rights supported by larger 
interests and will not be subject to the degree of subversion 
that is possible when legal rights are more narrowly drawn. 
VII. WHAT WILL THE FUTURE HOLD? 
The Family Support Act of 198888 (hereinafter FSA) will 
affect the welfare system in many respects that will influence 
legal rights.89 A major part of the Act is its emphasis on job 
opposed to race- or group-specific strategies. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTA<:IW (1987). 
87. See S. SKOG, REAGONOMICS, WOMEN AND POVERTY IN POVERTY AND SOCIAL 
JUb"''ICE (1987); GERTUDE SCHAFFERS & ELEANOR KREMEN, THE FEMINIZATION OF 
POVERTY (1990). 
88. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2342 (1988). 
89. See Timothy J. Casey, Family Support Act of 1988, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
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training. States are required to set up job programs with the 
goal of requiring AFDC recipients to work. Success of this 
program will be dependent on the ability of the states to create 
or find jobs for recipients. Therefore, it will be especially 
important for advocates of the poor to focus on the right to a 
decent job. Some people will find jobs as welfare recipients 
have always done but the goals will largely be unmet because 
the Act does not address the economic problems which foster 
high unemployment. The common interests of the poor and the 
working class must first merge to address the policies of using 
recession and high unemployment as the means to fight 
inflation. 
To some extent the FSA allows states to have discretion 
and decentralization in the creation of its JOBS90 programs. 
As I have argued, without adequate budgets and a responsible 
administration, this change to discretion and decentralization 
will create continued abuses of discretion. Many states will 
impose degrading and unreasonable conditions on recipients in 
an effort to get them off welfare. 
In other areas, the FSA has taken away discretion as all 
states will be required to have AFDC-UP programs.91 
However, the states retain the discretion to set benefit levels. 
This discretion in benefit levels will continue to result in 
tragically low benefit levels in many states. The push to 
abandon state discretion and set a national minimum AFDC 
standard will likely continue. 
Given the present direction of welfare reform,9 :l we can 
expect that the next decade will continue to see a great deal of 
discretion in the continued experimentation with training and 
employment programs. These will necessarily involve some 
individual discretion as the selection of training programs is by 
its nature a highly individualistic one. Sanctions will be 
imposed on those that do not meet the new expectations. We 
can expect that unfairness will creep in to some degree as to 
those who are sanctioned as the street level bureaucrat makes 
distinctions based upon those he/she feels are deserving or 
9:30 (1989). 
90. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-48fi, 102 Stat. 2856-2SH1 
(1988). 
91. !d. at 102 Stat. 2~m8-2400 (1988). 
92. See PHOEBE COTIINGHAM & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 
1990s (1989). 
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undeserving. There is likely to be a continued shift in program 
design, operation and control from the federal to the state level. 
Whether this will result in any improvement again will depend 
on whether states will provide adequate budgets and whether 
the administrators will be working in an environment that 
encourages them to act responsibly towards the needs of the 
poor. This, in turn, will depend upon the success of the political 
struggle, the ability of the poor to form social movements, and 
the ability to converge their interests with other groups. 
The poor will continue to face a threat to any progress out 
of poverty from the political far right in this country. As long 
as the far right is successful in convincing the public that the 
problem of poverty is simply the problem of individuals who are 
deviant or culturally different than the rest of the public any 
progress will be limited. The far rights control and shift of the 
dialogue should not be underestimated. To a large degree they 
have been able to seize the avenues of public discourse in the 
past decade to serve their own ends. 93 
The task of the poor is formidable. Some would say it is 
even insurmountable. But whether or not we continue to see 
progress in ending poverty, it is clear that legal rights serve 
not as an impediment to change but as a catalyst for change. 
Legal rights have given some power and dignity to the 
struggles of the poor and its potential has not yet been 
realized. 
9a. See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE RISE OF THE COUNTER-ESTABLISHMENT (1988); 
JOHN SALOMA Ill, OMINOUS POLITICS (1984). 
